Toaw Scenario: End of The Reich

Europe,
September 18, 1944,

Axis army of 1340 units opposed to Allies army of 1223 units
for a battle of complexity 3.47 at Division(XX) level
on a 15 Km/Hex map
for 130 turns of Half Week each.

by Jim Burke and Joerg Lissa submited on 21-11-2002

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Briefing
END OF THE REICH? Half week Version / PBEM Version Date: Sept. 18, 1944-Dec. 1945. Location: Europe, 15km per hex Time scale: Half week turns Length: 130 turns Unit Scale: Division/Brigade *Notes to this shorten/PBEM Version* At this point i want to say thank you to the original author J. Burke for his permission to modify his original Version. This scenario is mainly for PBEM players, who don't want to play 400 turns, but also for those who play versus PO. I have shorten the scenario to 130 turns/ half week including modifiy of the original events and adding more nice events. Also there are some major changes in this version, mainly supply and replacement corrections. Germany struggles to stem the tide, and gain time for the production of advanced weapons that, in sufficient numbers, promise to turn the tide (ME-262s, Type XXI Electric U-Boats, V-2s), as well as Hitler's promised "miracle weapon" -- which will force the Allies to seek a modus vivendi with Germany. Hitler's publicly-touted "miracle weapon" was, in fact, a radiation weapon then under development, which could have been delivered against London or Antwerp using modified V-2s launched from sites in Northern Holland and Northwestern Germany. Historical accounts indicate that while analysts at SHAEF argued (in various estimates from early Sept.) that organized German resistance would likely cease by Dec. 1, Hitler, and many senior German officers, did not consider defeat inevitable until they had seen the results of long-awaited Allied offensives in early '45. Hitler had gained a breathing space from Sept-Dec.'44, but was left with no option other than a desperate gamble to regain the strategic initiative before the opening of the Russian winter offensive. The period from July 1944 to early Sept. 1944 saw one unmitigated disaster after another for Germany: (1) the Allied breakout in France followed by a rapid retreat to hastily prepared defense lines near the German border; (2) the collapse of Army Group Center; (3) the defection of Romania, which led to the collapse of Germany's Southern flank and the nearly complete destruction of the 6th Army, as well as the loss of access to the Ploesti oil fields; (4) the defection of Bulgaria, with its army later moving into the line against German forces in Yugoslavia; (5) the capitulation of Finland; and (6) the near encirclement of Army Group North (prevented only by determined German counter-attacks to keep the lifeline to Riga open). Pulp histories suggest that at this point the defeat of Germany was inevitable. However... The Allied gains of the summer of 1944 had come at a tremendous cost in men and equipment. The combat efficiency of many Soviet units had dropped to extremely low levels, with personnel shortfalls made up by press-ganging un-trained and un-reliable men from the Ukraine and Byelorussia. Soviet and Western Allied lines of supply were also over-extended, and exposed. Successes against Army Group Center left Soviet forces under the threat of a strong counter-attack from German forces in the Baltics and Prussia. Stalin would have to focus for the next few months on clearing and bolstering that flank, as well as re-supplying his forces in Poland, before renewing the drive on Berlin. German forces also held firm in Italy along the Gothic line. At the same time, Hitler's decision after the Normandy invasion to intensify Germany's defense production (wartime production peaked in Sept. 1944, despite massive Allied air raids) made it possible to rapidly rebuild devastated units. The net result was a strategic pause and opportunity that Hitler knew would be temporary. This scenario was designed for the user to play the role of Chief of the OKW (Alfred Jodl, historically), who will -- in theory -- succeed in pursuading Hitler to pursue alternative strategies to regain the strategic initiative. What Ifs? Might a series of smaller counter- attacks in the West and East designed to restore a stable front-line, e.g., cutting off Allied units in Holland (the proposed "Operation Holland") and more determined attacks to eliminate the Soviet bridgehead across the Vistula gain more time for the Fatherland than the options taken historically? Would a rapid withdrawal of Army Group North (opposed by Hitler, who wanted to tie down Soviet forces that could be used for the winter offensive), or a decision to abandon the Gothic Line in Italy -- once German forces had retreated from Yugoslavia -- in favor of pulling back to strong points in the Appenines, have aided in the defense of Germany proper? Was there still a chance to throw Soviet forces moving into Hungary and Romania off balance, and regain the initiative in the Balkans -- and, with luck, access to the Ploesti oil fields? Allied options are many, but programmed possibilities include a British landing on the Dalmatian coastline (to prevent the withdrawal of German forces in the region), a re-direction of the Allied airborne assault historically used to cross the Rhine to achieve some other objective, and deployment of the Soviet Guards Airborne Army for an assault on Berlin (considered by Stalin historically). Note: amphibious assaults on Denmark and Northern Germany were never seriously considered by Allied planners at this stage of the war, due to the lack of strategic focus inherent in the options, in addition to many operational problems associated with them. The curtain rises: Eisenhower decided on 10 Sept. '44 on a bold gamble -- Operation Market- Garden -- to keep German forces off balance, and cut off access to V-2 launch sites in Northern Holland. On Sept. 16, 1944, in a conference at the FHQu Wolfsschanze in East Prussia, Hitler decided, after a review of strategic options on the Eastern and Wetern fronts, to launch a counter-attack through the Ardennes to capture Antwerp. The next day, Allied airborne forces landed in Holland. The battle is joined... SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: Germany surrenders when/if Allied forces enter Berlin. The German player does not have the option of retreating to an Alpine fortress (an option never seriously considered by Hitler, because it augured a respite of only a few weeks before the inevitable [but one used by the Soviets in their deception activities to direct the Western advance away from Berlin]). Hungary will surrender when/if Allied forces occupy Budapest. Bulgaria and Romania will withdraw their forces from the Allied coalition if German forces reach the Danube river valley, reflecting a break-through of Soviet lines that triggers indecision in the politically unreliable commands of both armies. U.S. escalation to the use of Atomic weapons is possible starting Aug. 1, 1945 . Germany will respond with an escalation to the use of chemical weapons. Germany may also respond by using new radiation weapons, contingent upon: the German player's possession of V-2 launch sites in Northern Holland and Northwest Germany, both atomic reactor sites (near Regensburg or Nordhausen), and V-2 production facilities at Nordhausen and Peenemunde. Allied supplies will be enhanced if Walcheren Island is captured (reflecting the use of Antwerp). German/Hungarian supplies will be disrupted if Allied forces occupy the Ruhr, Silesia, the Katowice area, or oil refining regions 1 or 2. ** German/Hungarian supplies will be dramatically enhanced if German forces succeed in driving on Ploesti and Bucharest. NOTES: Every effort was made to generate force structures and correlations that matched historical levels (the impact of the strategic air war was modeled through the event editor). While most of the unit designations, ordnance figures, and army/front level command designations & deployments are accurate, time prohibited getting everything perfect. The scale of this scenario, limits on the number of units, and time required that certain units be created to reflect their operational employment in this scenario rather than their "correct" command structures and deployment patterns (e.g., German bridging units deployed as regiments, rather than a hod

Briefing

END OF THE REICH?

Half week Version / PBEM Version

Date: Sept. 18, 1944-Dec. 1945.
Location: Europe, 15km per hex
Time scale: Half week turns
Length: 130 turns
Unit Scale: Division/Brigade

***Notes to this shorten/PBEM Version***

At this point i want to say thank you to the original author J. Burke for his permission to modify his original Version.
This scenario is mainly for PBEM players, who don't want to play 400 turns, but also for those who play versus PO. I have shorten the scenario to 130 turns/ half week including modifiy of the original events and adding more nice events.
Also there are some major changes in this version, mainly supply and replacement corrections.

Germany struggles to stem the tide, and gain time for the production of advanced weapons that, in sufficient numbers, promise to turn the tide (ME-262s, Type XXI Electric U-Boats, V-2s), as well as Hitler's promised "miracle weapon" -- which will force the Allies to seek a modus vivendi with Germany. Hitler's publicly-touted "miracle weapon" was, in fact, a radiation weapon then under development, which could have been delivered against London or Antwerp using modified V-2s launched from sites in Northern Holland and Northwestern Germany. Historical accounts indicate that while analysts at SHAEF argued (in various estimates from early Sept.) that organized German resistance would likely cease by Dec. 1, Hitler, and many senior German officers, did not consider defeat inevitable until they had seen the results of long-awaited Allied offensives in early '45. Hitler had gained a breathing space from Sept-Dec.'44, but was left with no option other than a desperate gamble to regain the strategic initiative before the opening of the Russian winter offensive.
The period from July 1944 to early Sept. 1944 saw one unmitigated disaster after another for Germany: (1) the Allied breakout in France followed by a rapid retreat to hastily prepared defense lines near the German border; (2) the collapse of Army Group Center; (3) the defection of Romania, which led to the collapse of Germany's Southern flank and the nearly complete destruction of the 6th Army, as well as the loss of access to the Ploesti oil fields; (4) the defection of Bulgaria, with its army later moving into the line against German forces in Yugoslavia; (5) the capitulation of Finland; and (6) the near encirclement of Army Group North (prevented only by determined German counter-attacks to keep the lifeline to Riga open). Pulp histories suggest that at this point the defeat of Germany was inevitable. However...
The Allied gains of the summer of 1944 had come at a tremendous cost in men and equipment. The combat efficiency of many Soviet units had dropped to extremely low levels, with personnel shortfalls made up by press-ganging un-trained and un-reliable men from the Ukraine and Byelorussia. Soviet and Western Allied lines of supply were also over-extended, and exposed. Successes against Army Group Center left Soviet forces under the threat of a strong counter-attack from German forces in the Baltics and Prussia. Stalin would have to focus for the next few months on clearing and bolstering that flank, as well as re-supplying his forces in Poland, before renewing the drive on Berlin. German forces also held firm in Italy along the Gothic line. At the same time, Hitler's decision after the Normandy invasion to intensify Germany's defense production (wartime production peaked in Sept. 1944, despite massive Allied air raids) made it possible to rapidly rebuild devastated units. The net result was a strategic pause and opportunity that Hitler knew would be temporary.
This scenario was designed for the user to play the role of Chief of the OKW (Alfred Jodl, historically), who will -- in theory -- succeed in pursuading Hitler to pursue alternative strategies to regain the strategic initiative.
What Ifs? Might a series of smaller counter- attacks in the West and East designed to restore a stable front-line, e.g., cutting off Allied units in Holland (the proposed "Operation Holland") and more determined attacks to eliminate the Soviet bridgehead across the Vistula gain more time for the Fatherland than the options taken historically? Would a rapid withdrawal of Army Group North (opposed by Hitler, who wanted to tie down Soviet forces that could be used for the winter offensive), or a decision to abandon the Gothic Line in Italy -- once German forces had retreated from Yugoslavia -- in favor of pulling back to strong points in the Appenines, have aided in the defense of Germany proper? Was there still a chance to throw Soviet forces moving into Hungary and Romania off balance, and regain the initiative in the Balkans -- and, with luck, access to the Ploesti oil fields? Allied options are many, but programmed possibilities include a British landing on the Dalmatian coastline (to prevent the withdrawal of German forces in the region), a re-direction of the Allied airborne assault historically used to cross the Rhine to achieve some other objective, and deployment of the Soviet Guards Airborne Army for an assault on Berlin (considered by Stalin historically). Note: amphibious assaults on Denmark and Northern Germany were never seriously considered by Allied planners at this stage of the war, due to the lack of strategic focus inherent in the options, in addition to many operational problems associated with them.
The curtain rises: Eisenhower decided on 10 Sept. '44 on a bold gamble -- Operation Market- Garden -- to keep German forces off balance, and cut off access to V-2 launch sites in Northern Holland. On Sept. 16, 1944, in a conference at the FHQu Wolfsschanze in East Prussia, Hitler decided, after a review of strategic options on the Eastern and Wetern fronts, to launch a counter-attack through the Ardennes to capture Antwerp. The next day, Allied airborne forces landed in Holland. The battle is joined...

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:
** Germany surrenders when/if Allied forces enter Berlin. The German player does not have the option of retreating to an Alpine fortress (an option never seriously considered by Hitler, because it augured a respite of only a few weeks before the inevitable [but one used by the Soviets in their deception activities to direct the Western advance away from Berlin]).
** Hungary will surrender when/if Allied forces occupy Budapest.
** Bulgaria and Romania will withdraw their forces from the Allied coalition if German forces reach the Danube river valley, reflecting a break-through of Soviet lines that triggers indecision in the politically unreliable commands of both armies.
** U.S. escalation to the use of Atomic weapons is possible starting Aug. 1, 1945 . Germany will respond with an escalation to the use of chemical weapons. Germany may also respond by using new radiation weapons, contingent upon: the German player's possession of V-2 launch sites in Northern Holland and Northwest Germany, both atomic reactor sites (near Regensburg or Nordhausen), and V-2 production facilities at Nordhausen and Peenemunde.
** Allied supplies will be enhanced if Walcheren Island is captured (reflecting the use of Antwerp).
** German/Hungarian supplies will be disrupted if Allied forces occupy the Ruhr, Silesia, the Katowice area, or oil refining regions 1 or 2.
** German/Hungarian supplies will be dramatically enhanced if German forces succeed in driving on Ploesti and Bucharest.

NOTES: Every effort was made to generate force structures and correlations that matched historical levels (the impact of the strategic air war was modeled through the event editor). While most of the unit designations, ordnance figures, and army/front level command designations & deployments are accurate, time prohibited getting everything perfect. The scale of this scenario, limits on the number of units, and time required that certain units be created to reflect their operational employment in this scenario rather than their "correct" command structures and deployment patterns (e.g., German bridging units deployed as regiments, rather than a hod