Toaw Scenario: Zhukov Attacks

Russia & Balkans,
May 06, 1941,

Axis army of 695 units opposed to Allies army of 835 units
for a battle of complexity 2.8 at Division(XX) level
on a 15 Km/Hex map
for 115 turns of Full Day each.

by Jim Burke submited on 22-11-2002

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Briefing
ZHUKOV ATTACKS, May-June 1941: Germany Responds to a Preemptive Soviet Offensive. Version: 3 Scale: 15km (EE/Balkans/Med) Date: April 6, 1941 -- Aug. 1, 1941 For Play Only as Germans BACKGROUND: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed in Sept. '39, paved the way for WWII. However, fallout from Stalin's invasion of Finland in Nov. '39 and events in June 1940 soon made war between Germany and Stalin's empire all but inevitable. That June, Soviet forces invaded the Baltic states and certain Romanian territories (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) -- at a time when the bulk of the Germany Army was committed to the campaign in France (Paris fell on June 16), and would soon be committed to a planned invasion of England (which was not finally called off until late in the fall -- to resolve the "Eastern problem"). The limited attack on Romania was particularly disconcerting to Hitler due to Germany's reliance on that country's energy resources. Thus, soon after France's surrender Hitler ordered that contingency plans be drawn up for an offensive in the East. Operation Barbarossa, formalized in Directive 21, was approved by Hitler on December 18, 1940, and set a target launch date of May 15, 1941. Soviet intelligence sources informed Stalin of Hitler's intentions (including the target launch date). Although suspicious of every report, Stalin did not sit still. According to documentation released from ex-Soviet archives in the early 1990s, the Soviet General Staff worked feverishly to perfect their war plan, which assumed that an initial period of war involving battles in the frontier regions (either absorbing an attack or launching a preemptive "counter-offensive") would be followed (weeks, months later) by a decisive offensive towards Warsaw/Silesia, and then onto Berlin. A key intellectual force behind Soviet war preparations was General G.K. Zhukov, the successful commander of Soviet combined-arms offensives at Kalkhin-Gol (Aug. '39) and into Bessarabia (June '40). A new Soviet war plan re-directing the focus of Soviet planning to territories south of the Pripet marshes (that is, under Zhukov's leadership), was adopted on 14 Oct. '40. At war games held with Stalin present in Dec.-Jan.'41, Zhukov stole the show with his creative work. Within days, Zhukov was named the new Chief of Staff. Within a month a detailed mobilization plan, MP-41, had been approved, which required that Soviet forces (for the "initial period of war") be brought up to necessary force levels within 30 days. That plan assumed strategic warning of an imminent attack of 10-15 days -- creating a need to anticipate German intentions, mobilize accordingly, and seize the initiative. Over the next few months, Zhukov and Defense Commissar S.K. Timoshenko prepared a detailed plan for a theater-wide "preemptive counter-offensive" (a formal Soviet planning concept), one that could start on or after May 15, 1941 (the date originally set for Barbarossa). The primary objective of the offensive was a strategic envelopment of Warsaw and Silesia (the Southwestern Front's objectives probably included seizing Romania's oil fields). What was Stalin planning? "Viktor Suvorov," R.C. Raack, and others have argued that Stalin may have been preparing for an offensive war, with Suvorov going out on a limb to argue that Stalin had a launch date set for early July (a thesis impossible to support after decisions made on May 13-14 -- see below). The possibility that Soviet planning switched from offensive to defensive sometime in May was considered by Dmitri Volkogonov. A Soviet military expert, David Glantz, has made a strong case, based largely on analyses of force capabilities, that Stalin would have been a fool to listen to Zhukov and launch an offensive in May-July 1941. Glantz's dismissive analysis actually rests on two assumptions: Stalin did not have confidence enough in Zhukov and Timoshenko to follow their advice, and/or that Zhukov and Timoshenko came up with the plan at the last moment (targeting May 15), i.e., it was completely out of sync with Soviet force dispositions and prior planning (a conclusion suggesting panic, and a degree of incompetence, on the part of Zhukov, particularly when he is reported to have urged that an offensive be launched ASAP). All of these assumptions are hard to support based on Zhukov's meteoric rise, known temperament, and some interesting aspects of Soviet force dispositions, including: the deployment of large numbers of Soviet aircraft very close to the frontier, the deployment of extensive reserves south of the Pripet marshes (the most logical main axis for a Soviet offensive was towards Silesia, while the most logical place to concentrate forces for defense was north of the Pripet), and the decision in April to create 5 airborne corps. TIMELINE: Stalin initiated MP-41 just days after German and allied forces invaded Yugoslavia and Greece on April 5, 1941 (postponing Barbarossa's starting date to June 22). A large proportion of Soviet forces near the frontier, along with certain strategic reserves (airborne corps), were, in fact, mobilized (though not necessarily fully trained and up to full strength) by May 13, 1941 (within the 30-day window contemplated by MP-41). Important units for offensive operations were the first to be mobilized. In April Stalin approved the creation of 5 airborne corps, and the transfer of Zhukov's best units from the Far East (after FM Molotov secured a neutrality pact with Japan on April 13). Follow-up echelons were expected to finish mobilizing in phases -- by early June and early July. Stalin may have seen an opportunity to launch an offensive into the German rear as a result of the German campaign in the Balkans (which few contemporaries expected to end so quickly). He did, in fact, make a bold move on April 4 to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the new Yugoslav government (and thus risked war, or at least gave him a pretext for launching one). On May 5, at a meeting with military academy graduates in the Kremlin, Stalin told them:"The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army" (Volkogonov). During the defense buildup of 1937-1941, Stalin and other senior Party and military officials had articulated a view which held that a new world war would occur in the near future, and that the Soviet Union would attack, but only once the West (Germany) had gone through internal convulsions similar to 1918. Turning Point...On May 13, Stalin approved the mobilization, by June 10, of 4 mobile reserve armies. The next day, Defense Commissar Timoshenko and Zhukov sent orders to all relevant military districts to"work out a detailed plan of defense of the state frontier" by May 30, 1941. The following day, Zhukov and Timoshenko reportedly pressed their case for an immediate offensive (most likely targeting May 15 or June 10 launch dates). Stalin may have rejected the option or been indecisive (Germany's attack precludes us from knowing for certain, absent additional archival discoveries). What could have prompted Stalin to lose confidence in his strategic plans? Germany's lightning successes in Yugoslavia and Greece, incomplete mobilization (the pace was slower than expected) and a lingering lack of confidence in his field commanders were all likely factors. SCENARIO: You, the chief of the OKH, must first sweep the Balkans of enemy forces as soon as possible, in order to prepare for the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22 and deter a preemptive Soviet strike. You must capture Crete, which has a high victory point total, and will prevent a British counter-stroke. Then, you must capture Phase 1 objectives (Nikolaev, Cherkassy, Kiev, Gomel, Mogiliev, Orsa, Vitebsk, Daugavpils, and Riga) by Aug. 1. Your supplies for Barbarossa will be severely depleted if Soviet forces manage to seize Ploesti. Soviet forces may attack at any time between May 15-June 22, and are more likely to do so if you get bogged down in Greece. (Please do not examine Soviet force dispositions and objectives before playing the scenario).

Briefing

ZHUKOV ATTACKS, May-June 1941: Germany Responds to a Preemptive Soviet Offensive.

Version: 3

Scale: 15km (EE/Balkans/Med)
Date: April 6, 1941 -- Aug. 1, 1941
For Play Only as Germans

BACKGROUND: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed in Sept. '39, paved the way for WWII. However, fallout from Stalin's invasion of Finland in Nov. '39 and events in June 1940 soon made war between Germany and Stalin's empire all but inevitable. That June, Soviet forces invaded the Baltic states and certain Romanian territories (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) -- at a time when the bulk of the Germany Army was committed to the campaign in France (Paris fell on June 16), and would soon be committed to a planned invasion of England (which was not finally called off until late in the fall -- to resolve the "Eastern problem"). The limited attack on Romania was particularly disconcerting to Hitler due to Germany's reliance on that country's energy resources.
Thus, soon after France's surrender Hitler ordered that contingency plans be drawn up for an offensive in the East. Operation Barbarossa, formalized in Directive 21, was approved by Hitler on December 18, 1940, and set a target launch date of May 15, 1941.
Soviet intelligence sources informed Stalin of Hitler's intentions (including the target launch date). Although suspicious of every report, Stalin did not sit still. According to documentation released from ex-Soviet archives in the early 1990s, the Soviet General Staff worked feverishly to perfect their war plan, which assumed that an initial period of war involving battles in the frontier regions (either absorbing an attack or launching a preemptive "counter-offensive") would be followed (weeks, months later) by a decisive offensive towards Warsaw/Silesia, and then onto Berlin.
A key intellectual force behind Soviet war preparations was General G.K. Zhukov, the successful commander of Soviet combined-arms offensives at Kalkhin-Gol (Aug. '39) and into Bessarabia (June '40). A new Soviet war plan re-directing the focus of Soviet planning to territories south of the Pripet marshes (that is, under Zhukov's leadership), was adopted on 14 Oct. '40. At war games held with Stalin present in Dec.-Jan.'41, Zhukov stole the show with his creative work. Within days, Zhukov was named the new Chief of Staff.
Within a month a detailed mobilization plan, MP-41, had been approved, which required that Soviet forces (for the "initial period of war") be brought up to necessary force levels within 30 days. That plan assumed strategic warning of an imminent attack of 10-15 days -- creating a need to anticipate German intentions, mobilize accordingly, and seize the initiative. Over the next few months, Zhukov and Defense Commissar S.K. Timoshenko prepared a detailed plan for a theater-wide "preemptive counter-offensive" (a formal Soviet planning concept), one that could start on or after May 15, 1941 (the date originally set for Barbarossa). The primary objective of the offensive was a strategic envelopment of Warsaw and Silesia (the Southwestern Front's objectives probably included seizing Romania's oil fields).

What was Stalin planning? "Viktor Suvorov," R.C. Raack, and others have argued that Stalin may have been preparing for an offensive war, with Suvorov going out on a limb to argue that Stalin had a launch date set for early July (a thesis impossible to support after decisions made on May 13-14 -- see below). The possibility that Soviet planning switched from offensive to defensive sometime in May was considered by Dmitri Volkogonov. A Soviet military expert, David Glantz, has made a strong case, based largely on analyses of force capabilities, that Stalin would have been a fool to listen to Zhukov and launch an offensive in May-July 1941. Glantz's dismissive analysis actually rests on two assumptions: Stalin did not have confidence enough in Zhukov and Timoshenko to follow their advice, and/or that Zhukov and Timoshenko came up with the plan at the last moment (targeting May 15), i.e., it was completely out of sync with Soviet force dispositions and prior planning (a conclusion suggesting panic, and a degree of incompetence, on the part of Zhukov, particularly when he is reported to have urged that an offensive be launched ASAP). All of these assumptions are hard to support based on Zhukov's meteoric rise, known temperament, and some interesting aspects of Soviet force dispositions, including: the deployment of large numbers of Soviet aircraft very close to the frontier, the deployment of extensive reserves south of the Pripet marshes (the most logical main axis for a Soviet offensive was towards Silesia, while the most logical place to concentrate forces for defense was north of the Pripet), and the decision in April to create 5 airborne corps.

TIMELINE: Stalin initiated MP-41 just days after German and allied forces invaded Yugoslavia and Greece on April 5, 1941 (postponing Barbarossa's starting date to June 22). A large proportion of Soviet forces near the frontier, along with certain strategic reserves (airborne corps), were, in fact, mobilized (though not necessarily fully trained and up to full strength) by May 13, 1941 (within the 30-day window contemplated by MP-41). Important units for offensive operations were the first to be mobilized. In April Stalin approved the creation of 5 airborne corps, and the transfer of Zhukov's best units from the Far East (after FM Molotov secured a neutrality pact with Japan on April 13). Follow-up echelons were expected to finish mobilizing in phases -- by early June and early July.
Stalin may have seen an opportunity to launch an offensive into the German rear as a result of the German campaign in the Balkans (which few contemporaries expected to end so quickly). He did, in fact, make a bold move on April 4 to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the new Yugoslav government (and thus risked war, or at least gave him a pretext for launching one). On May 5, at a meeting with military academy graduates in the Kremlin, Stalin told them:"The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army" (Volkogonov). During the defense buildup of 1937-1941, Stalin and other senior Party and military officials had articulated a view which held that a new world war would occur in the near future, and that the Soviet Union would attack, but only once the West (Germany) had gone through internal convulsions similar to 1918.

Turning Point...On May 13, Stalin approved the mobilization, by June 10, of 4 mobile reserve armies. The next day, Defense Commissar Timoshenko and Zhukov sent orders to all relevant military districts to"work out a detailed plan of defense of the state frontier" by May 30, 1941. The following day, Zhukov and Timoshenko reportedly pressed their case for an immediate offensive (most likely targeting May 15 or June 10 launch dates). Stalin may have rejected the option or been indecisive (Germany's attack precludes us from knowing for certain, absent additional archival discoveries).

What could have prompted Stalin to lose confidence in his strategic plans? Germany's lightning successes in Yugoslavia and Greece, incomplete mobilization (the pace was slower than expected) and a lingering lack of confidence in his field commanders were all likely factors.

SCENARIO: You, the chief of the OKH, must first sweep the Balkans of enemy forces as soon as possible, in order to prepare for the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22 and deter a preemptive Soviet strike. You must capture Crete, which has a high victory point total, and will prevent a British counter-stroke. Then, you must capture Phase 1 objectives (Nikolaev, Cherkassy, Kiev, Gomel, Mogiliev, Orsa, Vitebsk, Daugavpils, and Riga) by Aug. 1. Your supplies for Barbarossa will be severely depleted if Soviet forces manage to seize Ploesti. Soviet forces may attack at any time between May 15-June 22, and are more likely to do so if you get bogged down in Greece. (Please do not examine Soviet force dispositions and objectives before playing the scenario).