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China, July 23, 1937, Japan army of 20 units opposed to China army of 24 units for a battle of complexity 0.38 at Brigade(X) level on a 15 Km/Hex map for 10 turns of Full Day each. by John H. Ebert submited on 05-01-2003 Rugged-Defense Playing Statistics
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Sino-Japanese War Scenario 1: "HOKUSHI JIHEN" "The North China Incident" The campaign to pacify North China and capture Peiping and Tientsin. -=- Location: China, Hopei province Scale: 15 km per hex Time Scale: full day turns Dates: July 23rd - 31st, 1937 -=- Background: On the night of July 7th, 1937, a unit from a Japanese garrison in North China clashed with Chinese forces guarding the walled village of Wanping, several miles from Peiping. In addition to its proximity to the ancient capital, Wanping was also a strategic point overlooking the important rail link known as the Marco Polo Bridge. Though the Japanese were entirely within their treaty rights (as stipulated by the Boxer Protocol of 1901) to both be in Peiping and conduct exercises at night, their frequent comings and goings and overall arrogance was seen as especially irritating to the Chinese. Exactly what they were doing that night, or whether the exercises were entirely necessary, are issues debated even now. The exact cause and chronology of this clash are not authoritatively written anywhere; conflicting, biased, and entirely unverifiable accounts are available from a wide variety of Japanese, Chinese, and western sources. Just who fired the first shot, and why, will forever be in dispute, though this fact is not nearly as important as the string of unremarkable misunderstandings that repeatedly exploded into full blown firefights after the initial exchange. Between the first incident at Marco Polo Bridge, and what was to become a general mobilization of Japanese troops into North China, nearly three weeks of negotiations, hand wringing, brinksmanship, bad timing, and misunderstandings on both sides would pass before hostilities openly commenced. On July 9th, the question of how Japan was to respond was debated in an emergency cabinet meeting. Though War Minister Sugiyama believed sending three divisions to North China would quiet things down, Foreign Minister Koki Hirota's view, that the incident should be 'settled locally', prevailed that day. (a 'local settlement' was a battlefield agreement between belligerants in a specific locality, and did not involve direct government to government negotiations) Though talks were underway in accordance with this policy, another firefight broke out on the 10th, supposedly sparked accidentally by firecrackers going off in Wanping. Despite events like this, a settlement was eventually negotiated in large measure due to the personal intervention of both General Hashimoto and Sung Chi-yuen, commander of the 29th Corp and all Chinese troops in North China. The agreement, proposed by the Japanese and largely accepted by the Chinese 29th Army, involved punishing those Chinese deemed responsible for killing a Japanese soldier, taking steps to ensure similar incidents were prevented, toning down the rhetoric of anti-Japanese organizations, and force pull-backs. Sung and Hashimoto began carrying out the plan, and all seemed quiet... Despite the personal friendship between Hashimoto and Sung and the agreement they insisted upon, neither commander was able to prevent inflexible or careless leaders on his respective side from creating the appearance of disregard for the delicate truce. The region's poor communications infrastructure made updates from China infrequent and delayed, which caused members of Prime Minister Konoye's cabinet to worry about the apparent lack of progress in negotiations. On July 20th, in another cabinet meeting, Navy Minister Yonai and Foreign Minister Hirota again quashed War Minister Sugiyama's plan to send troops to China, but before the day was out a report came in saying that Japanese troops were fired upon yet again. That evening it was decided to "prepare" to mobilize three divisions, and let the Chinese not-so-subtly know that these "preparations" were taking place in an effort to "push" them closer to a local settlement. Several ministers threatened resignation upon hearing the news of mobilization, though plans were made to allow for their recall if the sitatuation improved. The timing and content of announcements out of Tokyo, North China, and Nanking began to seem contradictory and disingenuous. Upon hearing what China deemed as Japan's "threat" to send additional troops into China, Chiang Kai-shek gave his own "on the brink" speech at a meeting of business leaders, and made sure leaders in Tokyo heard it, too. The position of the hard liners was hardened further still. In a surprising bit of good news, On July 22nd, Japanese forces in North China reported that the reinforcements were not necessary on account of lower tensions in the area. Unfortunately, two more 'indicents' on the night of the 25th destroyed what little goodwill remained between the two governments, and actual mobilization of the three divisions was ordered in Tokyo. The Chinese 29th Army reinforced itself as best it could, and declared an "all-out battle of resistance." All bets were off as open hostilities commenced with the Japanese bombing of Langfang on July 26th... -=- Operational Considerations: Japanese forces (red colored units) are positioned north of the Great Wall, awaiting rail transit in Shanhaikwan, embarked on ships, and stationed in and around Tientsin. They must control the objectives of Peiping, Lukowchiao, the Fengtai railyards, Tungchow, Langfang, Tientsin, and all roads in between to achieve decisive victory. This operation must be completed before the end of the month! Chinese forces (olive drab units) are positioned primarily in and around greater Peiping, along strategic routes, and outside Tientsin. "Peace Preservation" forces of autonamous and puppet regimes are positioned in Tungchow and Peiyuan. The Chinese must seek to delay superior Japanese forces at all points of their advance, and defeat them wherever possible. If the Japanese can be stalled long enough, they can be denied a quick victory and the fighting, in all likelihood, can end in North China. -=- Events: The Japanese 5th Division arrives unassembled and understrength starting on or about the 27th of July. There is a chance that either the 1st Indpendent Mixed Brigade or the 6th Division's 11th Brigade (the Sakai and Suzuki brigades, respectively), or both, will not be detached from duty in Manchukuo. This is an ahistorical event intended to simulate a lower degree of war ferver in the Japanese cabinet. There is a chance the majority of the Chinese 143rd Division stationed in Inner Mongolia will participate in this operation. This is an ahistorical event intended to simulate a greater sense of urgency within the Chinese military. Other events include atrocities such as the Chinese murder of over 300 Japanese civilians in Tungchow on July 29th (the first real atrocity of the war), and the Japanese sacking of the town and execution of the garrison in retaliation. -=- Reference Sources: "History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-45", Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, Chung Wu Publishing Company, 1971. "The Sino Japanese War 1937-41", Frank Dorn, Macmillan, 1974. "The Rise and Fall of Imperial Japan", S.L. Mayer, The Military Press, 1976. "Prelude to Pearl Harbor", Roy M. Stanley II, Scribners, 1982. "A Military History of Modern China", F. F. Liu, Princeton University Press, 1953. "War Criminal - The Life and Death of Hirota Koki", Saburo Shiroyama, 1974. The title, "History of the Sino Japanese War 1937-45", is the English translation of the condensed "official history," as written by the Military History Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China. Scenario graphic scanned from issue #11 of "Shina Jihen Gahou" (China Incident Pictorial), Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbunsha (Tokyo Daily Newspaper Company), December 1, 1937. -=- Scenario Testers: Ricky Gray Wes Yanaga Tim McBride Paul Abrahamse Aaron Price David Heath and The Gamers Net Please visit www.thegamers.net/toaw www.wargamer.com/toaw -=- Scenario design by: John H. Ebert whoeva@ibm.net |