Toaw Scenario: Fedala-Casablanca

North Africa,
November 08, 1942,

USA army of 73 units opposed to Cichy army of 51 units
for a battle of complexity 0.57 at Company(I) level
on a 2.5 Km/Hex map
for 12 turns of Half Day each.

by Jeff Meriam submited on 23-11-2002

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Briefing
The operations of the Center Attack Group, Operation TORCH, Northwest Africa, November 1942. Version 1.0 Designed by Jeff Meriam, January 1999, kjmeriam@gte.net Half-day turns Begin 8 November 1942 End 12 turns later Unit size: Company and Battalion 2.5 kilometers per hex Southern climate area Occasional precipitation Hot temperature French forces: Brown on dark blue U.S. forces: Various on light green Major events: There is a slight (5%) probability the U.S. efforts to arrange an unopposed landing prevail and the French surrender on Turn 1. There is a great probability (75%) the French will agree to an armistice and surrender on Turn 9 (historical). The U.S. 30th Infantry Regiment is withdrawn on turn 4 to simulate its historical turn to the northeast to block any French relief forces from the Rabat area. Briefing: One part of the largest amphibious operation in history up to that point, the augmented 3rd United States Infantry Division lands at Fedala, Morocco. Its primary objective is to capture the city of Casablanca. A great deal of policital manuvering by the United States is underway to secure an unopposed landing, including a visit by General Mark Clark. However, the U.S. misread the French chain-of-command in the Casablanca area, and they secure the agreement of the wrong officer. The area commander of all French forces does not agree, and orders resistance immediately. In actual fact, neither he nor his forces know initially the attacker is the United States. They never hear President Roosevelt's radio announcement of the Allied invasion and his appeal to not resist. For their part, the untried American ground forces perform relatively poorly, but succeed primarily due to very light French resistance. Significantly, the main American problems are logistical. This includes poor cargo loading decisions that force the ground commander to halt the advance of American troops due to a lack of . . . trucks . . . to haul supplies to the forward troops. Is this a precursor of the logistic problems in the allied advance across France in 1944? Also in short supply are troops to off-load supplies on the beaches. However, the truck shortage is worst and the beaches are soon choked with supplies slowing down the off-loading of combat troops, and even further slowing down the advance. The importance of the Center Attack Group's success is made clear by Samuel Eliot Morison: "Both the Northern and Southern Attacks might have failed without greatly affecting the major objectives; but if the Center Group failed the whole expedition was a disaster." In actual fact, the Naval battle was much more decisive and exciting than the land battles, but TOAW admittedly does not simulate naval engagements well. I have done what I could, but I encourage you to read the Samuel Eliot Morrison account of the naval battle in the source listed below. General George Patton commanded the overall ground operation in this area. Two events are "pure Patton" and are worth recounting. First: as the supplies on the beach piled up, the cargo handling troops were under sporadic enemy fire and were huddled in what protection they could find. Patton strode up and down the beach, unprotected, exhorting them to do their jobs as only he could. Second: of the terms of the unofficial and informal interim armistice agreement between General Patton and senior French officers in Casablanca, George F. Howe had this to say - "When this generous arrangement had been concluded, the anxieties of the French were revived by General Patton's insistance that one more requirement must be met, and were then suddenly relieved by his explanation of its nature. For he proposed a toast - to the liberation of France by the joint defeat of the common enemy." Designer note: Typically this scenario ends before the U.S. and French forces are fully engaged east of Casablanca. If you want to fight it out, you only have to do two things: change the length of the scenario to 24 or so turns and eliminate events 3, 4 and 6. You do this in the editor, then resave the scenario. Just be sure you have the original .sce file backed up sonewhere. Sources: History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II: Operations in North African Waters. Samuel Eliot Morison U.S. Army in World War II; The Mediterranean Theater of Operations; North West Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. George F. Howe U.S. Army in World War II; The Army Ground Froces; The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. Kent Roberts Greenfield, et al The France 1940 website: members.tripod.com/~France40/ The TO&E website: www.hobbyhq.org/orbats/

Briefing

The operations of the Center Attack Group, Operation TORCH, Northwest Africa, November 1942.

Version 1.0

Designed by Jeff Meriam, January 1999, kjmeriam@gte.net

Half-day turns
Begin 8 November 1942
End 12 turns later
Unit size: Company and Battalion
2.5 kilometers per hex
Southern climate area
Occasional precipitation
Hot temperature
French forces: Brown on dark blue
U.S. forces: Various on light green

Major events:

There is a slight (5%) probability the U.S. efforts to arrange an unopposed landing prevail and the French surrender on Turn 1.

There is a great probability (75%) the French will agree to an armistice and surrender on Turn 9 (historical).

The U.S. 30th Infantry Regiment is withdrawn on turn 4 to simulate its historical turn to the northeast to block any French relief forces from the Rabat area.

Briefing:

One part of the largest amphibious operation in history up to that point, the augmented 3rd United States Infantry Division lands at Fedala, Morocco. Its primary objective is to capture the city of Casablanca.

A great deal of policital manuvering by the United States is underway to secure an unopposed landing, including a visit by General Mark Clark. However, the U.S. misread the French chain-of-command in the Casablanca area, and they secure the agreement of the wrong officer. The area commander of all French forces does not agree, and orders resistance immediately. In actual fact, neither he nor his forces know initially the attacker is the United States. They never hear President Roosevelt's radio announcement of the Allied invasion and his appeal to not resist.

For their part, the untried American ground forces perform relatively poorly, but succeed primarily due to very light French resistance.

Significantly, the main American problems are logistical. This includes poor cargo loading decisions that force the ground commander to halt the advance of American troops due to a lack of . . . trucks . . . to haul supplies to the forward troops. Is this a precursor of the logistic problems in the allied advance across France in 1944?

Also in short supply are troops to off-load supplies on the beaches. However, the truck shortage is worst and the beaches are soon choked with supplies slowing down the off-loading of combat troops, and even further slowing down the advance.

The importance of the Center Attack Group's success is made clear by Samuel Eliot Morison:
"Both the Northern and Southern Attacks might have failed without greatly affecting the major objectives; but if the Center Group failed the whole expedition was a disaster."

In actual fact, the Naval battle was much more decisive and exciting than the land battles, but TOAW admittedly does not simulate naval engagements well. I have done what I could, but I encourage you to read the Samuel Eliot Morrison account of the naval battle in the source listed below.

General George Patton commanded the overall ground operation in this area. Two events are "pure Patton" and are worth recounting. First: as the supplies on the beach piled up, the cargo handling troops were under sporadic enemy fire and were huddled in what protection they could find. Patton strode up and down the beach, unprotected, exhorting them to do their jobs as only he could. Second: of the terms of the unofficial and informal interim armistice agreement between General Patton and senior French officers in Casablanca, George F. Howe had this to say - "When this generous arrangement had been concluded, the anxieties of the French were revived by General Patton's insistance that one more requirement must be met, and were then suddenly relieved by his explanation of its nature. For he proposed a toast - to the liberation of France by the joint defeat of the common enemy."

Designer note: Typically this scenario ends before the U.S. and French forces are fully engaged east of Casablanca. If you want to fight it out, you only have to do two things: change the length of the scenario to 24 or so turns and eliminate events 3, 4 and 6. You do this in the editor, then resave the scenario. Just be sure you have the original .sce file backed up sonewhere.

Sources:

History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II: Operations in North African Waters. Samuel Eliot Morison

U.S. Army in World War II; The Mediterranean Theater of Operations; North West Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. George F. Howe

U.S. Army in World War II; The Army Ground Froces; The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. Kent Roberts Greenfield, et al

The France 1940 website: members.tripod.com/~France40/

The TO&E website:
www.hobbyhq.org/orbats/