Toaw Scenario: Dien Bien Phu 54 (By Berthiaux)

Indochina,
March 13, 1954,

French army of 52 units opposed to Viet minh army of 73 units
for a battle of complexity 1.23 at Battalion(II) level
on a 2.5 Km/Hex map
for 120 turns of Half Day each.

by Christophe Berthiaux submited on 16-02-2003

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Briefing
DIEN BIEN PHU 1954 French " légionnaires ", " coloniaux " and paratroopers Against regular Viet divisions in Dien Bien Phu. Colors Vietminh Division 312: Blue on olive green Division 316: White on olive green Division 351: red on clear green Division 304: clear maroon on clear green Regular regiments: yellow on green Regiments patisans, partisans'companies: gray on black French "Légion": white on blue "Coloniaux": blue on blue Thaïs: green on maroon "Algerians" and "Moroccans" troops: blue on maroon Important events The troops replaced on Vietminh side outnumber the ones on the French side. The Vietminh have a major advantage at the beginning of the game. The French make up for the time and advantage they lost when Bigeard arrives. 60th's turn: the Vietminh dig efficient trenches and get their advantage back. If "Béatrice" falls into the hands of the Vietminh, the bombings of the runways will impede the French from receiving supplies. 8th's turn: the French player can use all the paratrooper battalions available in Indochina at this time. 60th's turn: the French are likely to be helped by U.S. bomber squadrons. MILESTONES November 20th, 1954; 10:40 a.m. - The 6th BPC (Colonial Paratrooper Battalion) led by Commandant Bigeard and the 2/1 RCP (Colonial Paratrooper Regiment) led by commandant Brechignac, dropped into the D.Z. "Natasha" in the vicinity of Muong-Than, a village that would be remembered in history books as Dien Bien Phu. The French immediately engaged in combat against Vietminh units (artillery regiment N° 148 and Infantry battalion N° 910). Operation "Castor" (Beaver) had just begun. For General Navarre, the Commanding officer of the F.E.C. (French expeditionary Corps) that decided to launch the offensive, the plan was ambitious. It would consist in seizing a zone that had been controlled by the Vietminh since 1947 and that was situated in the coast strip halfway between the north and the south from Hanoi down to Saigon. The conquest of this region would be called "Atlante" and the bigger part of the military powers would be needed for it. It would certainly compel Giap to order his divisions, N° 304 and 320, ready to head for the delta, to change their plans and go south, between the mountains and the see. But they still had to block the route of Laos. In January 1953, General Salan had already written in his secret directive N° 40: "The reoccupation of Dien Bien Phu should be the next few weeks, the first step towards our taking control of the Taï territory and the elimination of the Vietminh west of the Black River." The arguments in favor of operation "Castor" were not illogical. Dien Bien Phu had every necessary quality to fulfil the three roles it would have to play: first, block the route of Laos; then, be the rear base to help anti-Communist guerilla squads that landed to develop in the region; and, lastly, become the starting post for all medium- range operations against the enemy communication lines. For Navarre, Dien Bien Phu should of course not become an entrenched camp with enormous needs (a "meat grinder" as general Cogny later said) but, on the contrary, a light stronghold designed to replace Laï-Chau, rightly considered as a post impossible to defend if seriously attacked. Besides, for the population living in the higher valleys, Dien Bien Phu was considered as the historical Thaï capital city, therefore highly symbolical. Thus, for Navarre and his staff officers, Dien Bien Phu was not an essential operation the whole strategy depend upon, but a tactical element of prudence which had its other practical advantages. All those elements make up the basic idea of the strategy they do not take the reactions of the adversaries into account. Indeed, Giap would surely not witness this new offensive without reacting. What's more, for anyone intending to make headway to the Mekong, the capture of Dien Bien Phu is essential: it is a post that cannot be bypassed. There is no other passable route, unless the mountains are made low or the valleys are made straight. Moreover, the French in Dien Bien Phu represented a much more serious threat for the security of the Vietminh back lines than those in Laï-Chau, a post which was actually about to fall. On November 22nd, the French secret services were able to announce that divisions N° 308, 312 and 351 had been told to get Tuan-Giao by forced marches. In Navarre's opinion, Giap was bound to have made up his mind to engage in combat. "Castor" had only been thought of and planned as a minor operation. If Navarre accepted the fight, it would become a major one. But, if he refused it, he would temporally be holding the upper hand over his adversary and his divisions mired in impassable roads in the higher regions. But in that case, Laos, one of the most faithful associates, would be at the communists' mercy. Giap had already given up once, and after the beginning of the Geneva Conference, he felt the French would not necessarily get outside help from the Americans and the British if a peace plan in Indochina was possible. Navarre first gave up the idea of combat; then, he finally accepted it and decided to fight to the bitter end. Dien Bien Phu, the "hedgehog", rapidly became a stronghold swarming with soldiers. The paratroops who had taken part in the operation from day one were relieved of their posts by eleven battalions, among which two paratrooper's battalions. The hills over Dien Bien Phu were turned into bases of operations, each representing a stronghold with its networks of bunkers and barbed wires. As early February, the Vietminh tightened the noose around the entrenched camp. The combats became fiercer, the casualties higher and higher. The last attempts by the French to overrun the East hills were crushed by the Bo-doï resistance. The Viet had drawn the lines. They were impossible to cross. March 13 , 5:18 p.m.- Hell struck in the center of the entrenched camp and Béatrice. All the canons of the 351st armored division fired at the same time. The shells were mainly dropped on the H.Q. zone. Colonel Gaucher and his staff were killed within the first hours of battle. The 13th D.B.L.E. (French Legion) had now lost its commanding officer and its 3rd battalion was crushed by the shells dropped on the base of operation Béatrice. March 14, 3:00 a.m.- Organized resistance had totally stopped in Béatrice. The Legion battalion was, so to speak, destroyed. March 15, 8:00 a.m.- It was now Gabrielle's turn to fall into enemy hands after relentless resistance. The very same day, Colonel Piroth, in charge of the French artillery, seeing that their counter-battery fire was useless, blew himself to bits with a grenade. March 16, dawn- The Taï who controlled the hills Anne Marie 1 and Anne Marie 2 vanished into the air, without even fighting. The French troops were suffering from extremely low morale. However, the arrival of the famous 6th B.P.C. with Commandant Bigeard as its commanding officer would changed things. Fore everyone, it meant that the garrison would not be inflicted defeat without striking back any longer. If Giap wanted to win, he would have to pay the price. And the battle lasted 55 days. 60 000 Vietminh soldiers against 10 000 French soldiers. Self-denial, determination and courage were the troops everyday lot-on both sides. May , 5:30 p.m. - Exhausted, the French Army in Dien Bien Phu ceased fire.

Briefing

DIEN BIEN PHU 1954

French " légionnaires ", " coloniaux " and paratroopers Against regular Viet divisions in Dien Bien Phu.

Colors

Vietminh

Division 312: Blue on olive green

Division 316: White on olive green

Division 351: red on clear green

Division 304: clear maroon on clear green

Regular regiments: yellow on green

Regiments patisans, partisans'companies: gray on black

French

"Légion": white on blue

"Coloniaux": blue on blue

Thaïs: green on maroon

"Algerians" and "Moroccans" troops: blue on maroon

Important events

The troops replaced on Vietminh side outnumber the ones on the French side.

The Vietminh have a major advantage at the beginning of the game.

The French make up for the time and advantage they lost when Bigeard arrives.

60th's turn: the Vietminh dig efficient trenches and get their advantage back.

If "Béatrice" falls into the hands of the Vietminh, the bombings of the runways will impede the French from receiving supplies.

8th's turn: the French player can use all the paratrooper battalions available in Indochina at this time.

60th's turn: the French are likely to be helped by U.S. bomber squadrons.

MILESTONES

November 20th, 1954; 10:40 a.m. - The 6th BPC (Colonial Paratrooper Battalion) led by Commandant Bigeard and the 2/1 RCP (Colonial Paratrooper Regiment) led by commandant Brechignac, dropped into the D.Z. "Natasha" in the vicinity of Muong-Than, a village that would be remembered in history books as Dien Bien Phu. The French immediately engaged in combat against Vietminh units (artillery regiment N° 148 and Infantry battalion N° 910). Operation "Castor" (Beaver) had just begun.

For General Navarre, the Commanding officer of the F.E.C. (French expeditionary Corps) that decided to launch the offensive, the plan was ambitious. It would consist in seizing a zone that had been controlled by the Vietminh since 1947 and that was situated in the coast strip halfway between the north and the south from Hanoi down to Saigon.

The conquest of this region would be called "Atlante" and the bigger part of the military powers would be needed for it. It would certainly compel Giap to order his divisions, N° 304 and 320, ready to head for the delta, to change their plans and go south, between the mountains and the see.

But they still had to block the route of Laos. In January 1953, General Salan had already written in his secret directive N° 40: "The reoccupation of Dien Bien Phu should be the next few weeks, the first step towards our taking control of the Taï territory and the elimination of the Vietminh west of the Black River."

The arguments in favor of operation "Castor" were not illogical. Dien Bien Phu had every necessary quality to fulfil the three roles it would have to play: first, block the route of Laos; then, be the rear base to help anti-Communist guerilla squads that landed to develop in the region; and, lastly, become the starting post for all medium- range operations against the enemy communication lines.

For Navarre, Dien Bien Phu should of course not become an entrenched camp with enormous needs (a "meat grinder" as general Cogny later said) but, on the contrary, a light stronghold designed to replace Laï-Chau, rightly considered as a post impossible to defend if seriously attacked. Besides, for the population living in the higher valleys, Dien Bien Phu was considered as the historical Thaï capital city, therefore highly symbolical.

Thus, for Navarre and his staff officers, Dien Bien Phu was not an essential operation the whole strategy depend upon, but a tactical element of prudence which had its other practical advantages.

All those elements make up the basic idea of the strategy they do not take the reactions of the adversaries into account. Indeed, Giap would surely not witness this new offensive without reacting. What's more, for anyone intending to make headway to the Mekong, the capture of Dien Bien Phu is essential: it is a post that cannot be bypassed. There is no other passable route, unless the mountains are made low or the valleys are made straight. Moreover, the French in Dien Bien Phu represented a much more serious threat for the security of the Vietminh back lines than those in Laï-Chau, a post which was actually about to fall.

On November 22nd, the French secret services were able to announce that divisions N° 308, 312 and 351 had been told to get Tuan-Giao by forced marches.

In Navarre's opinion, Giap was bound to have made up his mind to engage in combat. "Castor" had only been thought of and planned as a minor operation. If Navarre accepted the fight, it would become a major one. But, if he refused it, he would temporally be holding the upper hand over his adversary and his divisions mired in impassable roads in the higher regions. But in that case, Laos, one of the most faithful associates, would be at the communists' mercy. Giap had already given up once, and after the beginning of the Geneva Conference, he felt the French would not necessarily get outside help from the Americans and the British if a peace plan in Indochina was possible.

Navarre first gave up the idea of combat; then, he finally accepted it and decided to fight to the bitter end.

Dien Bien Phu, the "hedgehog", rapidly became a stronghold swarming with soldiers. The paratroops who had taken part in the operation from day one were relieved of their posts by eleven battalions, among which two paratrooper's battalions. The hills over Dien Bien Phu were turned into bases of operations, each representing a stronghold with its networks of bunkers and barbed wires.

As early February, the Vietminh tightened the noose around the entrenched camp. The combats became fiercer, the casualties higher and higher. The last attempts by the French to overrun the East hills were crushed by the Bo-doï resistance. The Viet had drawn the lines. They were impossible to cross.

March 13 , 5:18 p.m.- Hell struck in the center of the entrenched camp and Béatrice. All the canons of the 351st armored division fired at the same time. The shells were mainly dropped on the H.Q. zone. Colonel Gaucher and his staff were killed within the first hours of battle. The 13th D.B.L.E. (French Legion) had now lost its commanding officer and its 3rd battalion was crushed by the shells dropped on the base of operation Béatrice.
March 14, 3:00 a.m.- Organized resistance had totally stopped in Béatrice. The Legion battalion was, so to speak, destroyed.

March 15, 8:00 a.m.- It was now Gabrielle's turn to fall into enemy hands after relentless resistance. The very same day, Colonel Piroth, in charge of the French artillery, seeing that their counter-battery fire was useless, blew himself to bits with a grenade.

March 16, dawn- The Taï who controlled the hills Anne Marie 1 and Anne Marie 2 vanished into the air, without even fighting. The French troops were suffering from extremely low morale.

However, the arrival of the famous 6th B.P.C. with Commandant Bigeard as its commanding officer would changed things. Fore everyone, it meant that the garrison would not be inflicted defeat without striking back any longer. If Giap wanted to win, he would have to pay the price.

And the battle lasted 55 days. 60 000 Vietminh soldiers against 10 000 French soldiers. Self-denial, determination and courage were the troops everyday lot-on both sides.

May , 5:30 p.m. - Exhausted, the French Army in Dien Bien Phu ceased fire.