Briefing
Angola 71-74 1. 1- Introduction In 1968 the east of Angola was exposed to the incursions of the 3 independence movements (FNLA, MPLA, UNITA). To the defend a sparsely populated territory with over 700.000 square kilometres there were not much more than four infantry battalions. With the arrival of Gen. Costa Gomes in 1970, a new area of command is created covering all this territory the ZML (Zona Militar Leste or East Military Zone), Gen. Bettencourt Rodrigues is appointed as commander, together with Gen. Costa Gomes a new type of operations contemplating anti-insurrection activities, population aid, and small forces actions are integrated in joint strategic planning?s. The forces are reinforced up to twelve battalions, including commando troops, two horse squadrons, air forces, parachutists, marines and native auxiliary troops, making 21.500 men in arms. At the start of 1974, the FNLA and the MPLA had been driven out of the area, and political agreements neutralized UNITA. The reorganization of forces and operations achieved a military victory in the East for Portugal. 2. 2- The forces in presence and their objectives Portugal and native forces ? In 1971 the Portuguese forces had ended the reorganization and were ready to deal with the guerrilla, there was a full array of means, airborne, commandos, light armour, infantry and also auxiliary native forces, plus there will be special reinforcements of powerful commando units, the objective is of course to strike directly the guerrilla. The Portuguese forces have the mobility and the means to fight and win. Guerrilla ? Although the three movements have a common goal, they have different ways to achieve them, the FNLA at the north has a strong battalion but nothing more, therefore aiming for limited objectives, UNITA at the central region is divided into three military regions, well armed and efficient, their objective is to consolidate their presence in the area, MPLA is the strongest of the three, organized in battalions the main objective was to strike at the main towns and control them, to consolidate the presence in the area and to prepare the assault on the capital, Lourenço Marques. 3. 3- Main events There are shock effects on the Portuguese if the guerrilla captures Luso, Silva Porto, Serpa Pinto or Cuito Canavale. If the guerrilla occupies Cuito Canavale, then it will release a strong South African unit for the Portuguese side, which in turn will release Zambian and Zairian backed guerrillas. This is a what if event, in reality South Africa gave to the Portuguese a small support in the form of air transport and offered to the Portuguese to place a small infantry force operating up to the 17º parallel, which the Portuguese refused, after Portugal left Angola there was unrest in South Africa about the probability of the guerrillas expanding to their territory, this fact made the background for the South African intervention in Cuito Canavale in 1978. The South Africans fielded the 32º Inf. Battalion composed from South African command staff and as the bulk of the battalion were the ex-Portuguese native forces the Flechas that meanwhile went south with the departure of the Portuguese, latter they also fielded the 31º Inf. Battalion composed of Bushimanes that occupied the south of Angola and north of Namibia. I?m assuming that the South Africans offer help and it?s accepted, using as bulk three Flechas units that are withdrawn they compose a force that will enter near Serpa Pinto and will conduct is actions south of the 17º parallel. It is obvious that in response to this international escalation the governments of Zaire and Zambia, that already supported the guerrilla would do something to keep the flow running their way, therefore they would most likely place some guerrilla forces of their own in the area. 4. 4- Theatre options 4.1. Portuguese options Turn 1 ? Send infiltration units to Zaire and Zambia: The Portuguese fielded some special native units that worked inside Zaire and Zambia disrupting the guerrilla supply lines and bases, if you select this option then you?ll disrupt guerrilla supply in 30% for 6 months, once used it doesn?t reappear. Turn 100 - Start negotiations with UNITA: Since 1966 that there was an approximation between Portugal and UNITA, it culminated in 1973 in a truce that last a couple of months, it caused great divisions inside the Portuguese command structure and in a change of command some small attacks by Portuguese forces in the UNITA areas ended the truce. It costs 3VP because of the explained above and after four months there is a 80% chance of UNITA reassuming the fight. Turn 100 ? Request more replacements: Portuguese forces had very limited replacement capability due to several factors like the increasing popular unrest in Portugal or the international blockade in military items, therefore to replace most of the lost material and men there is the need to specially request it with the corresponding cost, 3 VP. 4.2. Guerrilla options Turn 125 ? Start forced recruitment: Guerrillas in Angola always drafted personnel by the simple expedient of raiding villages and taking all men capable of firing a gun, this obviously made this type of action rather unpopular, but in times of intense fighting it was the only way to replace losses, it as obviously a cost for the loss of popular support, 3VP. 5. 5- Strategies 5.1. Portuguese The Portuguese forces are well placed to achieve victory, not only they have a numeric superiority but they also have powerful air support and air mobility, however all this has to be balanced with the fact that Portuguese regular army units have low proficiency, and the supply of the units is around 60% at the start. The main effort is to be made by the commando and airborne units, and by the two special groups entering as reinforcements, ?Agrupamento SIROCO? and ?Agrupamento RAIO?, this units in reality made the bulk of the effort and destruction of guerrilla battalions. It?s also advisable to avoid suffering the shock effects if the guerrilla takes any major town. It?s also not worth to wait for the South African force, as the guerrilla may chose wisely not to advance south to Cuito Canavale and therefore avoid the chance of South African intervention. Great care should be taken as your regular units will not be replaced easily, it will cost you to replace the losses, and the option is only available after around 100 turns. There are available several native auxiliary forces, this vary widely in performance, so a small explanation follows: Flechas ? Special forces trained by the Political Police, with a great knowledge of the terrain, and tracking of enemy units. Highly efficient. GE ? Volunteer force raised on a local level from villagers, mainly to act as local police. Medium to low quality force. Fieis and Leais- Forces made up from refugees from Zambia (Leais) and from the old Gendarmes of Zaire (Fieis). They were self-trained, and lived along with their families in the hope of a return to their country of origin. Medium efficiency. Strategically the Portuguese should try with the available forces to prevent further expansion from the guerrillas, try to round them up and when the ?Agrupamento RAIO?, ?Agrupamento SIROCO? or the South African battalion is available he should strike hard at this pockets of isolated guerrillas, as in all guerrilla scenarios great care should be taken to only attack surrounded guerrilla units, or they will split and you will end up with three problems instead of one? Great care should also be taken to keep open the communication lines, isolated forces will be doomed if attacked en-force by the guerrilla. 5.2. Guerrilla The key here is to understand the nature of the three movements in presence, in the north the FNLA has not enough forces to make the difference, in the centre UNITA has it?s own agenda and his politically unreliable, at any time can conclude a truce agreement with the Portuguese and leave the fight, MPLA on the other hand is well placed to achieve success, it?s units are positioned over all the territory, reinforcements are on the way, and its highly efficient. A good strategy may be to aim directly at the cities and ?shock? the Portuguese that don?t have enough forces to cover effectively an all-out effort by the guerrilla, other strategy is to drag the fight everywhere forcing the Portuguese to pay VP?s for replacements and the truce with UNITA. The decision to go to Cuito Canavale, releasing not only the South Africans but also some valuable guerrillas from Zaire and Zambia is dependable on how well the war is going, if the Portuguese are already high giving them the Shouth Africans may sign your end, on the other side if things look bleak for the Portuguese then the South Africans won?t make a difference and with the extra forces you can end victorious. 6. 6- General notes At the start of the game the guerrilla player start?s far behind, however the theatre options are costly for the Portuguese and if forced to use them, it can turn the table. The Portuguese player should make full use of his air mobility, and of the total air superiority, it can make the difference. The supply routes for the guerrillas are long since their supply points are in the borders with Zambia and Zaire their a good target for the Portuguese player, but there are a lot of them and not enough forces to cover all of them so good judgement is needed if going for this option. The theatre options are costly for both sides and should be used with care, it can be a very good idea to make a truce with UNITA, but it?s only available when probably the Portuguese player will also need his replacements and the guerrilla has conquered some VP?s, it can actually be a bad idea. The guerrilla player can always force the Portuguese player to get replacements but to achieve that, heavy fighting must happen during some time over the entire scenario, this will probably also drain the guerrilla resources and force them to also need the replacements eventually rendering the fighting useless? Joao Lima

Briefing

Angola 71-74

1. 1- Introduction

In 1968 the east of Angola was exposed to the incursions of the 3 independence movements (FNLA, MPLA, UNITA). To the defend a sparsely populated territory with over 700.000 square kilometres there were not much more than four infantry battalions. With the arrival of Gen. Costa Gomes in 1970, a new area of command is created covering all this territory the ZML (Zona Militar Leste or East Military Zone), Gen. Bettencourt Rodrigues is appointed as commander, together with Gen. Costa Gomes a new type of operations contemplating anti-insurrection activities, population aid, and small forces actions are integrated in joint strategic planning?s. The forces are reinforced up to twelve battalions, including commando troops, two horse squadrons, air forces, parachutists, marines and native auxiliary troops, making 21.500 men in arms. At the start of 1974, the FNLA and the MPLA had been driven out of the area, and political agreements neutralized UNITA. The reorganization of forces and operations achieved a military victory in the East for Portugal.

2. 2- The forces in presence and their objectives

Portugal and native forces ? In 1971 the Portuguese forces had ended the reorganization and were ready to deal with the guerrilla, there was a full array of means, airborne, commandos, light armour, infantry and also auxiliary native forces, plus there will be special reinforcements of powerful commando units, the objective is of course to strike directly the guerrilla. The Portuguese forces have the mobility and the means to fight and win.

Guerrilla ? Although the three movements have a common goal, they have different ways to achieve them, the FNLA at the north has a strong battalion but nothing more, therefore aiming for limited objectives, UNITA at the central region is divided into three military regions, well armed and efficient, their objective is to consolidate their presence in the area, MPLA is the strongest of the three, organized in battalions the main objective was to strike at the main towns and control them, to consolidate the presence in the area and to prepare the assault on the capital, Lourenço Marques.

3. 3- Main events

There are shock effects on the Portuguese if the guerrilla captures Luso, Silva Porto, Serpa Pinto or Cuito Canavale.

If the guerrilla occupies Cuito Canavale, then it will release a strong South African unit for the Portuguese side, which in turn will release Zambian and Zairian backed guerrillas. This is a what if event, in reality South Africa gave to the Portuguese a small support in the form of air transport and offered to the Portuguese to place a small infantry force operating up to the 17º parallel, which the Portuguese refused, after Portugal left Angola there was unrest in South Africa about the probability of the guerrillas expanding to their territory, this fact made the background for the South African intervention in Cuito Canavale in 1978. The South Africans fielded the 32º Inf. Battalion composed from South African command staff and as the bulk of the battalion were the ex-Portuguese native forces the Flechas that meanwhile went south with the departure of the Portuguese, latter they also fielded the 31º Inf. Battalion composed of Bushimanes that occupied the south of Angola and north of Namibia. I?m assuming that the South Africans offer help and it?s accepted, using as bulk three Flechas units that are withdrawn they compose a force that will enter near Serpa Pinto and will conduct is actions south of the 17º parallel. It is obvious that in response to this international escalation the governments of Zaire and Zambia, that already supported the guerrilla would do something to keep the flow running their way, therefore they would most likely place some guerrilla forces of their own in the area.

4. 4- Theatre options

4.1. Portuguese options

Turn 1 ? Send infiltration units to Zaire and Zambia: The Portuguese fielded some special native units that worked inside Zaire and Zambia disrupting the guerrilla supply lines and bases, if you select this option then you?ll disrupt guerrilla supply in 30% for 6 months, once used it doesn?t reappear.
Turn 100 - Start negotiations with UNITA: Since 1966 that there was an approximation between Portugal and UNITA, it culminated in 1973 in a truce that last a couple of months, it caused great divisions inside the Portuguese command structure and in a change of command some small attacks by Portuguese forces in the UNITA areas ended the truce. It costs 3VP because of the explained above and after four months there is a 80% chance of UNITA reassuming the fight.
Turn 100 ? Request more replacements: Portuguese forces had very limited replacement capability due to several factors like the increasing popular unrest in Portugal or the international blockade in military items, therefore to replace most of the lost material and men there is the need to specially request it with the corresponding cost, 3 VP.

4.2. Guerrilla options

Turn 125 ? Start forced recruitment: Guerrillas in Angola always drafted personnel by the simple expedient of raiding villages and taking all men capable of firing a gun, this obviously made this type of action rather unpopular, but in times of intense fighting it was the only way to replace losses, it as obviously a cost for the loss of popular support, 3VP.

5. 5- Strategies

5.1. Portuguese

The Portuguese forces are well placed to achieve victory, not only they have a numeric superiority but they also have powerful air support and air mobility, however all this has to be balanced with the fact that Portuguese regular army units have low proficiency, and the supply of the units is around 60% at the start. The main effort is to be made by the commando and airborne units, and by the two special groups entering as reinforcements, ?Agrupamento SIROCO? and ?Agrupamento RAIO?, this units in reality made the bulk of the effort and destruction of guerrilla battalions. It?s also advisable to avoid suffering the shock effects if the guerrilla takes any major town. It?s also not worth to wait for the South African force, as the guerrilla may chose wisely not to advance south to Cuito Canavale and therefore avoid the chance of South African intervention.

Great care should be taken as your regular units will not be replaced easily, it will cost you to replace the losses, and the option is only available after around 100 turns.
There are available several native auxiliary forces, this vary widely in performance, so a small explanation follows:

Flechas ? Special forces trained by the Political Police, with a great knowledge of the terrain, and tracking of enemy units. Highly efficient.

GE ? Volunteer force raised on a local level from villagers, mainly to act as local police. Medium to low quality force.

Fieis and Leais- Forces made up from refugees from Zambia (Leais) and from the old Gendarmes of Zaire (Fieis). They were self-trained, and lived along with their families in the hope of a return to their country of origin. Medium efficiency.

Strategically the Portuguese should try with the available forces to prevent further expansion from the guerrillas, try to round them up and when the ?Agrupamento RAIO?, ?Agrupamento SIROCO? or the South African battalion is available he should strike hard at this pockets of isolated guerrillas, as in all guerrilla scenarios great care should be taken to only attack surrounded guerrilla units, or they will split and you will end up with three problems instead of one? Great care should also be taken to keep open the communication lines, isolated forces will be doomed if attacked en-force by the guerrilla.

5.2. Guerrilla

The key here is to understand the nature of the three movements in presence, in the north the FNLA has not enough forces to make the difference, in the centre UNITA has it?s own agenda and his politically unreliable, at any time can conclude a truce agreement with the Portuguese and leave the fight, MPLA on the other hand is well placed to achieve success, it?s units are positioned over all the territory, reinforcements are on the way, and its highly efficient. A good strategy may be to aim directly at the cities and ?shock? the Portuguese that don?t have enough forces to cover effectively an all-out effort by the guerrilla, other strategy is to drag the fight everywhere forcing the Portuguese to pay VP?s for replacements and the truce with UNITA.

The decision to go to Cuito Canavale, releasing not only the South Africans but also some valuable guerrillas from Zaire and Zambia is dependable on how well the war is going, if the Portuguese are already high giving them the Shouth Africans may sign your end, on the other side if things look bleak for the Portuguese then the South Africans won?t make a difference and with the extra forces you can end victorious.

6. 6- General notes

At the start of the game the guerrilla player start?s far behind, however the theatre options are costly for the Portuguese and if forced to use them, it can turn the table.

The Portuguese player should make full use of his air mobility, and of the total air superiority, it can make the difference.

The supply routes for the guerrillas are long since their supply points are in the borders with Zambia and Zaire their a good target for the Portuguese player, but there are a lot of them and not enough forces to cover all of them so good judgement is needed if going for this option.

The theatre options are costly for both sides and should be used with care, it can be a very good idea to make a truce with UNITA, but it?s only available when probably the Portuguese player will also need his replacements and the guerrilla has conquered some VP?s, it can actually be a bad idea.

The guerrilla player can always force the Portuguese player to get replacements but to achieve that, heavy fighting must happen during some time over the entire scenario, this will probably also drain the guerrilla resources and force them to also need the replacements eventually rendering the fighting useless?

Joao Lima