The Fall of Somoza

The final stages of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. As the US cuts its ties to the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas and their allies make a final push to seize control of the country.

This is an interesting scenario with many important lessons. It offers an excellent example of the final stage of a guerrilla war--the transformation of the guerrilla forces into a conventional army ready to take the offensive.

Guerrilla warfare is a much misunderstood subject, with many pseudo-experts and many myths based more in fantasy than reality. The most important thing to understand about guerrilla war is that it is not an offensive but a defensive strategy, a method of surviving while tying down enemy troops. The television image is one of dashing guerrilla raids but historically guerrilla forces have not been able to inflict much damage because of their lack of heavy weapons. At most, they inflict pinpricks on enemy logistical soft spots, but they are actually not very effective at inflicting casualties. They can tie down lots of enemy troops, but only to the extent that the enemy wishes to pursue them. If the enemy chooses simply to ignore the guerrillas, often they become irrelevant. As Mao said, the guerrilla is best at running away. Historically, the most effective use of partisan / guerrilla forces is in direct conjunction with conventional offensives. Note the Soviet Bagration offensive, for example--Soviet partisans struck at German logistics just prior to big Soviet attacks and at the most vulnerable areas for supply and retreat. Tito's Yugoslav partisans, on the other hand, really did not inflict much damage on the Germans, though they did tie down a few German divisions during the war. When it came to liberating Belgrade, however, the Yugoslav partisans could not do it without the assistance of Soviet conventional forces. Even with respect to China, we cannot overestimate guerrilla warfare, despite the Maoist formulas. Guerrilla practices helped the Chinese Communists to evade the Nationalists and Japanese for a long time, but to win the Chinese Civil War, they had to switch to conventional warfare. This was only possible because 1. Soviets gave Chinese Communists huge amounts of military aid, including and especially all of the Japanese military equipment which the Soviets captured in their Manchurian operation (Aug 45), 2. Soviets gave Chinese Communists control of Manchuria, the richest area of China, 3. Soviets exerted an influence on the West based upon its sheer size and proximity not to become too embroiled in the Chinese Civil War--based upon Western fears of possible Soviet countermoves. None of this means that the Chinese effort was not necessary, only that it alone was not sufficient. If we consider other historical examples, we also see that guerrilla warfare and political revolution are often impossible without foreign support (even if the foreign support is directed more against a third party than because of love of the recipient). The American Revolution would not have succeeded without the help of the anti-British French king. The Afghan mujahideen would have gotten nowhere without huge CIA assistance through friendly Pakistan. The Russian Bolsheviks needed the support of the Germans to overthrow the Russian government. The Vietcong depended upon North Vietnamese support along the Ho Chi Minh trail, and North Vietnam in turn received this aid from USSR and Eastern Europe (which, incidentally, is why no amount of aerial bombing of North Vietnam could destroy the stream of equipment coming from the other side of the planet in a place such as Czechoslovakia!). The Contras were dependent upon US aid through friendly Honduras. Even way back in Napoleon's time, we see the Spanish guerrillas giving the French a big headache, and of course it was the British directing and supplying them. The bottom line is that guerrillas are heavily dependent upon foreign support--without it, they can at best barely subsist in the deep countryside without any real influence (as with the Chinese Communists in the 1920's and 1930's). In this scenario, ironically, the Sandinistas receive support from both the US and the Cubans! Whether wisely or foolishly, according to the scenario designer, the Carter administration had been supporting the Sandinistas for a year before this scenario. Finally, for a guerrilla movement (or even just a political movement) to make a revolution, several things must occur. 1. rebels must transform into a conventional force capable of taking the offensive and thus achieving a decisive outcome (only the offensive can be decisive), 2. rebels must have the willpower and determination to seize control, 3. patron of the current government must abandon it in whole or in part (as with Batista in Cuba, the Shah in Iran, the South Vietnamese--the US finally says, "Oh, to hell with them") rationalizing this move in terms of lack of national interest, excessive corruption, political demoralization, or just plain utopian stupidity (Gorbachev's specialty, for example--"if I cut off my head, I will be the tallest of all!"), 3a. (this abandonment by the patron often coincides with attempts by the patron to seek an accomodation with the rebels--as with early US policy on Castro in Cuba), 4. indecisiveness, lack of willpower, and loss of thirst for power on the part of the ruling group leading to hesitation and refusal to use state power strongly in self defense. In grand strategic logistical-political terms, then, what we need is steady support for the rebels and wavering support for the government for a revolution to succeed. Underlying all of these factors are the "proper objective conditions", that is, a level of economic crisis which undercuts the current government and its ties to foreign patrons. However, the decisive moment of any political takeover is still the conventional phase, as in this scenario. If the rebels cannot succeed when they finally come out to attack the cities, then they will fail to come to power, as the mujahideen did in Afghanistan (when Soviets left, they took not two weeks as experts predicted but over two years finally to succeed). Just like in physics, there is always an initial friction which must be overcome, but once sufficient momentum is built up, then it becomes unstoppable. That is the key issue. There is a magic moment, the breaking of the ice, when the forces begin to act in concert to bring the structure down. However, if the government through stern measures can stop the rebellion cold before it achieves conventional success, then the whole thing just shuts down--at least until the next crisis. One alternative strategy is for the government to appease the rebels with concessions and compromise, but this often backfires and only further encourages the rebels. In fact, the compromise strategy only works when the rebel leaders are already essentially disloyal and wavering with respect to their own cause, and such rebels would therefore probably not come to power anyway. The only strategy with chances of success against resolute rebels is to hold fast and stop them cold before they can achieve irresistable momentum. That is the challenge in this scenario--for the Sandinistas, to push the revolution to a final victory; for Somoza's Guardia Nacional, to stop it cold. Historically, the Somoza government crumbled, panicked, and fled, only to be crushed. The Sandinistas, on the other hand, achieved sufficient momentum to propel themselves to power. Setting aside the political arguments, we as students of military history can learn some very valuable lessons from this scenario. "History respects neither the fool nor the coward; yet glory and victory shine upon the wise hero."