Toaw Scenario: The Contra Drive

Briefing
The Contra Drive 1. background This is a generic scenario representing a big offensive by the Contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The Contra objective is to gain control of towns, villages, and airstrips in the wide, rugged countryside of eastern Nicaragua. The Sandinistas, of course, must try to prevent this. The forces are well balanced. The contras have quite a few good conventional units in addition to their irregular forces--the result of generous US military aid and expertise. The contras also have the advantage of safe bases across the borders in Honduras and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas must decide whether to invade one or both of their neighbors to destroy these pesky bases, but they must be careful, because intrusions will bring the regular forces of Honduras and Costa Rica into the battle. This scenario gives us one more opportunity to examine the basics of guerrilla warfare. We find certain features in common with other scenarios, such as 1. the importance of foreign support for the rebels, 2. the conversion from irregular to regular warfare, 3. the political nature of warfare (politics and war as extensions of each other, mutually reinforcing and mutually influencing). In this case, the Contras have begun regular warfare in order to conquer the eastern, rural half of Nicaragua. If successful, the logical next step, the final phase of the final phase, so to say, would be to extend the offensive into the main, advanced portion of Nicaragua--the large cities of the west. However, the Nicaragua Sandinistas still have extremely powerful conventional forces. The Contras have the advantage of surprise, but as we have seen in other scenarios, this advantage erodes quickly with the passage of time. In this case, the main Sandinista military forces will take a few extra turns to arrive. It will be a good battle. Both sides have powerful forces and powerful political purposes. What good is war without a reason to fight? One interesting difference between this scenario and the "Civil War in El Salvador" is that here there is a lot more territory in which to move. This added mobility is an advantage for the rebels. In the El Salvador scenario, the rebels seem rather cramped in tiny corners of the country, but here in eastern Nicaragua, they can better move to attack or to flee as the case may be. Mobility is an important issue, with special implications for both offense and defense. Just consider, for example, the huge differences between the West Front in World War One and the Eastern Front in World War Two. The basic differences concerning mobility in these two situations create two totally different methods of combat. Strategy, operational art, and tactics are all functions of certain basic factors such as technology, quantity of armaments, and physical space. Increase or decrease the space (or any other basic factors), and everything else changes correspondingly. So out in eastern Nicaragua, the combat is going to be somewhat unique, and definitely different than in cramped El Salvador. EB

This is a generic scenario representing a big offensive by the Contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The Contra objective is to gain control of towns, villages, and airstrips in the wide, rugged countryside of eastern Nicaragua. The Sandinistas, of course, must try to prevent this. The forces are well balanced. The contras have quite a few good conventional units in addition to their irregular forces--the result of generous US military aid and expertise. The contras also have the advantage of safe bases across the borders in Honduras and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas must decide whether to invade one or both of their neighbors to destroy these pesky bases, but they must be careful, because intrusions will bring the regular forces of Honduras and Costa Rica into the battle. This scenario gives us one more opportunity to examine the basics of guerrilla warfare. We find certain features in common with other scenarios, such as 1. the importance of foreign support for the rebels, 2. the conversion from irregular to regular warfare, 3. the political nature of warfare (politics and war as extensions of each other, mutually reinforcing and mutually influencing). In this case, the Contras have begun regular warfare in order to conquer the eastern, rural half of Nicaragua. If successful, the logical next step, the final phase of the final phase, so to say, would be to extend the offensive into the main, advanced portion of Nicaragua--the large cities of the west. However, the Nicaragua Sandinistas still have extremely powerful conventional forces. The Contras have the advantage of surprise, but as we have seen in other scenarios, this advantage erodes quickly with the passage of time. In this case, the main Sandinista military forces will take a few extra turns to arrive. It will be a good battle. Both sides have powerful forces and powerful political purposes. What good is war without a reason to fight? One interesting difference between this scenario and the "Civil War in El Salvador" is that here there is a lot more territory in which to move. This added mobility is an advantage for the rebels. In the El Salvador scenario, the rebels seem rather cramped in tiny corners of the country, but here in eastern Nicaragua, they can better move to attack or to flee as the case may be. Mobility is an important issue, with special implications for both offense and defense. Just consider, for example, the huge differences between the West Front in World War One and the Eastern Front in World War Two. The basic differences concerning mobility in these two situations create two totally different methods of combat. Strategy, operational art, and tactics are all functions of certain basic factors such as technology, quantity of armaments, and physical space. Increase or decrease the space (or any other basic factors), and everything else changes correspondingly. So out in eastern Nicaragua, the combat is going to be somewhat unique, and definitely different than in cramped El Salvador.