Toaw Scenario: Bloody March

Briefing
Bloody March Based upon game "Central America" by Victory Games. 1. Background Emboldened by the political indecisiveness and bickering within the US government over the issue of Contra aid, the newly arrived Cuban General Nestor Lopez ordered a Sandinista attack against rebel forces during the Catholic Easter week celebrations. On 20 March 1986, FSLN forces invaded areas of central Honduras from which FDN units were insurging. The objective: to seize the FDN's Las Vegas base camp and thereby make Contra aid a dead issue. Meanwhile, on 24 March, the FSLN utilized Hind attack helicopters, T-55 tanks, BM-21 rockets, and aerial bombardment against several unarmed Miskito Indian villages in the vicinity of (and including) Kum. These units, therefore, were unavailable to support operations against the FDN. (description comes from the scenario verbatim) The Sandinista attack was prompted by political motives to cut US aid to the Contras, but because the Contras' victory on the battlefield resulted in the US Congress approving aid to the Contras, this strategy backfired completely. Perhaps the FSLN should have used its air, tank, attack helicopter, and katyusha assets against Las Vegas, as the scenario designer implies. It is often useful to concentrate offensive power on one decisive axis. There are various lessons to draw from this: 1. He who attacks everything attacks nothing. 2. Only operations in a decisive sector can produce decisive results. 3. The gambler wins battles but loses wars. 4. Better never to have attacked than to attack and lose. 5. War is a continuation of politics. It is our duty as students of military history to draw out the proper lessons and to absorb as much wisdom as possible from the battles of the past. 2. Forces 2.1. Communist FSLN (Nicaraguan Sandinistas) 2.2. Allied FDN (Contras) Honduras CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) EB

Emboldened by the political indecisiveness and bickering within the US government over the issue of Contra aid, the newly arrived Cuban General Nestor Lopez ordered a Sandinista attack against rebel forces during the Catholic Easter week celebrations. On 20 March 1986, FSLN forces invaded areas of central Honduras from which FDN units were insurging. The objective: to seize the FDN's Las Vegas base camp and thereby make Contra aid a dead issue.

Meanwhile, on 24 March, the FSLN utilized Hind attack helicopters, T-55 tanks, BM-21 rockets, and aerial bombardment against several unarmed Miskito Indian villages in the vicinity of (and including) Kum. These units, therefore, were unavailable to support operations against the FDN. (description comes from the scenario verbatim)

The Sandinista attack was prompted by political motives to cut US aid to the Contras, but because the Contras' victory on the battlefield resulted in the US Congress approving aid to the Contras, this strategy backfired completely.

Perhaps the FSLN should have used its air, tank, attack helicopter, and katyusha assets against Las Vegas, as the scenario designer implies. It is often useful to concentrate offensive power on one decisive axis. There are various lessons to draw from this:

1. He who attacks everything attacks nothing.
2. Only operations in a decisive sector can produce decisive results.
3. The gambler wins battles but loses wars.
4. Better never to have attacked than to attack and lose.
5. War is a continuation of politics.

It is our duty as students of military history to draw out the proper lessons and to absorb as much wisdom as possible from the battles of the past.