The events leading up to a massive Israeli pre-emptive strike against the UAR (United Arab Republic - the official name of Egypt at the time) on the morning of Monday, June 5th, 1967 are well documented and studied, but remain controversial to this day. Despite conspiracy theories on both sides, an objective reading of the historical record suggests neither side wanted war. A series of escalatory events and counter-measures in the political and diplomatic spheres led to an obviously untenable situation: close to 100,000 Egyptian troops deployed into a recently re-militarized Sinai Peninsula, watched nervously by an almost fully mobilized Israel Defense Force. In the end most analysts agree three major catalysts for war turned out to be:

1. May 16th-18th, 1967: The decision by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to demand the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai (UNEF) and UN Secretary General U Thant's quick acquiescence to that demand.

2. May 22nd, 1967: President Nasser's announcement of his intention to reestablish a blockade of the Strait of Tiran. (This cut off the Israeli port of Eilat and was publicly considered an act of war by the Israelis, since it violated assurances given Israel to induce their withdrawal from Sinai in 1956.)

3. May 30th, 1967: King Hussein of Jordan's surprise visit to Cairo and reconciliation with President Nasser. The two leaders conclude a mutual defense agreement putting the Jordanian Armed Forces under a joint Arab command led by Egypt.

Once these events had played out war became all but inevitable. President Nasser had staked his prestige and claim to moral leadership of the Arab world on his confrontational stance against Israel. Israel could neither accept the perpetual presence of such a large Egyptian force in the Sinai nor keep her armed forces mobilized indefinitely in order to maintain a favorable correlation of forces.

In the weeks leading up to war the Israelis viewed the Sinai front as decisive, and placed top priority on quickly defeating Egypt in the initial period of combat. To that end the overwhelming majority of IDF ground forces were concentrated against the Egyptians in the Sinai. The Israelis had well-developed plans for overcoming the Egyptian fortifications guarding the main access routes into Sinai: Rafah, the Abu 'Ujaylah/Umm Qatef/'Ayn al Qusaymah complex, and Al Kuntillah.

The Israeli Air Force was similarly planning to open the war with a massive surprise attack on the UAR Air Force at their bases. This operation, named 'Moked' (Focus), was meticulously refined over several years, and almost flawlessly executed on the morning of Monday, June 5th, 1967.

The key to success for the Israeli player is rapid capture of Egyptian fortified zones and strategic objectives:

As the Israelis occupy the above locations the event engine variable (EEV) value is incremented by the indicated amount. If the EEV reaches 7 before turn 4 (PM, June 6th, 1967) Egyptian Supreme Commander Field Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amer will panic and order a precipitous withdrawal of all Egyptian forces from the Sinai. The triggering of this event is made known with the news string: "Field Marshal 'Amer orders withdrawal from Sinai" (event 145 in the spreadsheet Sinai 1967 2.0.xls). Once this event occurs a cascade of dependent events are triggered over the next several turns resulting in the effective collapse of the UAR defense in Sinai. In addition, the Egyptian withdrawal from Sinai sequence of events will increase the likelihood that the scenario ends early (from turn 9 - 12).

Starting on turn 4 (PM, June 6th, 1967) there is a progressively increasing chance the Egyptian General Staff will convince Field Marshal 'Amer to defend Sinai, which will cancel the sequence of events described above. If this occurs, Egyptian forces will hold their positions and attempt to defend Sinai.

IMPORTANT: If the UAR side is being played by a human, they can select a Theater Option on turn 1 to disable the trigger for withdrawal from Sinai described above.

The default course of action for the UAR P.O. is to replicate the historical sequence of events as closely as possible (with just a little bit of uncertainty thrown in). This will probably not be satisfactory for a human-versus-human match to test an alternative UAR course of action: implement the 'al-Qahir' plan (described below) and defend Sinai.

The Israeli Defense Forces begin the scenario fully mobilized and ready to attack. The IDF Southern Command, under Brigadier General Y. Gavish, is divided into three division-sized task forces (Ugda): 84, led by Brigadier I. Tal, in the north facing Rafah and the Gaza Strip; 38, under Brigadier A. Sharon, facing the 'central route' through Umm Qatef and Abu 'Ujaylah; and 31, under Brigadier A. Yaffe, positioned between the other two and poised to exploit an undefended stretch of sand dunes and rough terrain considered impassable by the Egyptians.

An independent armored brigade, the 8th under Colonel A. Mandler, is positioned to capture the key crossroads at Al Kuntillah and divert Egyptian attention away from the main Israeli efforts along the more northerly axes.

The Israeli 11th Brigade (Mechanized), attached to Tal's Ugda 84, is tasked with assaulting and occupying the Gaza Strip.

Note the Israeli Parachute Battalion 80/65, already divided, ready to be transported by aircraft or helicopter, at Tel Nov airbase (111,1) at the start of the scenario. Historically this unit was inserted by helicopters into the rear of the Egyptian positions at Umm Qatef/Abu 'Ujaylah and assaulted the Egyptian 2nd Division's main artillery position at Ruwafa Dam (84,41).

Historically the Israeli Parachute Brigade 55 was staged at Lod IAP (114,0) in preparation for an airborne assault on Al'Arish. IMPORTANT: The Israeli player can select a Theater Option on turn 1 (AM, June 5th, 1967) to commit Brigade 55 to the battle for Jerusalem. If the Israeli player does not execute this Theater Option on turn 1 the UAR side is awarded 10 Victory Points.

Another formation with special capabilities in this scenario is the 'Adam' Infantry Brigade (an HQ, 3 'leg' infantry battalions, and a mortar battery; attached to Sharon's Division 38 on the central axis). The 3 'leg' infantry battalions are capable of traversing sand dunes and were historically used to first assault the Umm Qatef fortified complex through the sand dunes on its northern flank, and then to clear out bypassed Egyptian and Palestinian units in the sand dunes along the Gaza-Rafah-Al'Arish axis.

Selected Israeli units and formations begin withdrawing to other fronts starting on turn 6 (PM, June 7th, 1967).

The UAR Armed Forces begin the scenario almost fully mobilized as well, but at not as high a level of military readiness as their Israeli opponents. A significant portion of the UAR Armed Forces had been committed to a counter insurgency campaign in Yemen since the early 1960's. As a result, the Armed Forces' budget was chronically underfunded and while the main Egyptian fortified zones were formidable, the overall defensive plan for Sinai had yet to be fully implemented in June 1967. Also, after years of political machinations and appointment of cronies by Egyptian Field Marshal 'Amer, the UAR Armed Forces operated under a hopelessly convoluted and inefficient command structure. This would prove a fatal weakness once war broke out.

UAR ground forces in Sinai were supposed to be deployed according to the pre-war 'al-Qahir' (Conqueror) plan, which was essentially defensive. The plan called for three heavily fortified defensive lines running north-to-south across Sinai. Attacking Israeli forces were to be drawn deep into the interior where they would be surrounded and destroyed in concentric counter-attacks by Egyptian mobile forces. Unfortunately for the UAR, Field Marshal 'Amer deviated from this well-worked out plan almost from the beginning of the crisis. To maintain the option for offensive action and mislead Israeli intelligence, 'Amer had formations moving all over the Sinai peninsula in the weeks leading up to war. When war came, many UAR ground formations did not have coherent orders and were in neither effective defensive or offensive postures.

On the morning of the Israeli attack, all Egyptian division commanders in Sinai were attending a conference at Field Army Headquarters in Bir ath Thamadah. Moreover at the exact moment of the initial Israeli airstrike, Field Marshal 'Amer and Air Force Commander Sidqi Mahmud were in an Ilyushin Il-14 transport bound for the conference at Bir ath Thamadah base. Thus, the entire Egyptian force structure defending the Sinai was almost completely paralyzed during most of the first crucial day of the war.

The historical outcome of the 1967 was as dramatic as it was well known. The IDF decisively defeated the UAR Armed Forces and occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula in four days of major combat operations.

UAR casualties were officially put at 1,500 officers and 10,000 enlisted men. Israel claimed to have captured some 500 officers and 5,000 soldiers. UAR materiel losses were also very high: over 700 tanks, hundreds of artillery pieces and up to 10,000 trucks and other vehicles destroyed or captured.

Israeli losses were reported to be about 300 killed, over 1,000 wounded, and over 60 tanks destroyed.

The UAR Air Force lost at least 350 aircraft, most on the ground as a result of the surprise Israeli air strike on the morning of June 5th. Israeli Air Force losses were between 46 and 50 aircraft.

This scenario is specifically designed to be played by a human Israeli player against a UAR P.O. and produce a historically accurate result. The Israeli player is under the same time constraint as their historical counterpart - the game will be won or lost in the first few turns.

Due to the overwhelming influence of the first several turns on the course of the rest of the scenario, the Israeli player must go all out from the start to capture the six key objectives:

The UAR side will suffer a significant shock (and air shock) penalty on turn 1 (AM, June 5th, 1967). These penalties will be gradually reduced over the next few turns and Egyptian resistance should stiffen as a result. The event: "Field Marshal 'Amer orders withdrawal from Sinai," if and when it occurs, triggers progressively increasing shock penalties, pestilence, supply reductions, and random unit disbands for the UAR side.

Alternatively, if Egyptian forces are ordered to hold their positions and defend Sinai the negative effects described above do not occur - the initial shock penalty will eventually disappear completely. If this sequence of events occurs the scenario will run to its full length: 14 turns, ending PM, June 11th, 1967.

The Israeli side enjoys a slight shock bonus for the first 2 turns (mainly to prevent early turn endings) as well as a very substantial air shock bonus on turn 1 (AM, June 5th, 1967) and a smaller air shock bonus on turn 3 (AM, June 6th, 1967). Israeli replacements and supply are gradually reduced starting on turn 6 (PM, June 7th, 1967) to simulate their increasing commitment on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts.

When playing against a UAR P.O., if the Israeli player succeeds in triggering an Egyptian withdrawal from Sinai they are still faced with the challenge of maneuvering around/through a mass of Egyptian units fleeing toward the Suez Canal and capturing their objectives before the scenario ends.

Israeli movement bias is set to 133, enabling them to match their historical rates of advance. UAR movement bias is set to 120 as partial compensation. Israel's higher relative movement allowances reflect better training and maintenance as well as greater tactical flexibility.