It is the near future: US forces are still bogged down in Afghanistan (along with a solitary British brigade) and Iraq, with little improvement in the latter's army. The Bosnia/Kosovo situation remains unresolved, with a predominantly NATO task force still on the borders of, and much resented by, Serbia and Montenegro. Negotiations on expanding NATO from its present membership have stalled. The failure of the Kim dynasty to consolidate power has led to chaos in the Korean peninsula and, along with renewed Chinese sabre-rattling over Taiwan, has sucked the US strategic reserve to South-East Asia. Even moderate Arab states are now furious at the lack of progress over the question of Palestine with their governments in danger of being toppled if they are not seen to take some decisive action. Tensions in the region are heightened by the likelihood that Iran will develop a viable nuclear weapon in a matter of months.Hardliners in the Kremlin, who have watched with ill-concealed hatred the expansion of NATO to their very borders, now see a narrow window of opportunity. Cajoling or coercing its neighboring countries, Russia considers the possibility of a lightning strike to break NATO's new militaries and dictate an advantageous peace. It still has vast amounts of equipment in storage from the end of the Cold War, and the (admittedly ageing) conscripts trained to use it. Even if NATO hangs together its armed forces have been cut to the bone in the fallout from the global economic crisis. Just one major effort to smash through as far as Berlin, while the Arab League deals with Israel?

The minor 'roads' connecting some small islands may be used by ground units without the need for sealift.

PO both sides, but the Russian one will not attack the larger neutrals (50% possibility of Austria if Slovakia falls). Still far better against a friend if you have any.

'COSC' = Central Operational Strategic Command, 'WOSC' Western...etc. I'm assuming that the Pacific Operational Strategic Command will have to watch the Chinese and the other Asian nations. (but see below for the POSC 35th Army).

This is a massive reworking and update of Patrick Feyret's excellent Armageddon 2000, on a similar theme. I have tried and failed to contact him to get his permission for this: if you're reading this Patrick I do hope that you don't mind. It adds North Africa and the Middle East, making the scenario very complex.

This is largely researched from the net, using modern or planned OOBs, with a lot of Patrick's original TOEs, modified as far as possible: I've had to make some fairly heroic assumptions about the ability of Russia and its satellites to remobilise their older equipment, but in theory there is enough in storage to easily more than double their existing ground forces. The Belorussian and Ukrainian reserves are actual units that have been demobilised over the last decade, but for the Russians I've assumed that every existing infantry, armoured and conventional artillery brigade in the current standing army will be matched by an additional brigade of reserves. I've given them low proficiences, but there will still be a lot of heavy metal heading west, rather like Led Zeppelin on tour. Most para-military forces have been ignored as (i) they're not designed for high intensity combat and (ii) many of them will be tied down on internal security duties. They are represented to a certain extent by the small Russian garrisons that will appear in captured major NATO capitals and ports. Similarly the scenario assumes that trained reserves will be used as replacements for front-line units, not used to form completely new ones. The ORBAT takes into account that Arab countries with off-map areas will need to maintain forces along the southern borders (so don't look for the Tunisian Sahara Brigade, for example).

Do note that only air, naval, helicopter and guerillas will reconstitute, as they're assumed to have been driven off and scattered: but there will be no time to reform utterly destroyed ground formations.

Don't despair as the NATO player if the first few turns see the Poles, Balts and Rumanians receiving a good kicking: help is on the way, and the Russians need to penetrate deeply into central and western Europe, and Asia Minor, to win.

VPs represent political, not industrial or economic, points. While the long-term occupation of - say - the Ruhr cities would be more important than that of Tblisi, the Russians aim is to demonstrate to NATO's newer members, in a short and bloody offensive, that the alliance is utterly unable to defend them. Occupation of all of the countries immediately surrounding Russia and its allies (including the neutrals) will be sufficient to win a minor victory. For those of a sensitive disposition, do note that this isn't suggesting that western states reoccupy the Arab states in a renewed burst of colonialism: but to topple their existing governments may paralyse their ability to distract NATO from the crucial central European theatre. Nor are any of the underlying political assumptions intended to offend anyone - it's a wargame.

Comments and criticism welcome, but it's a big picture scenario: there's no point in telling me that there are three Spartans and two Sultans in a British infantry battalion HQ company, but that I've used one Spartan, three Scimitars and a Saladin. In some cases I've had to use an equivalent for ultra-modern equipment: so Tornados for Typhoons, Abrams for the Israeli Merkava IVs, Bradleys for Israeli Namers, etc.